Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge And Practical Reasoning by Baumann, Peter
Swarthmore College
Works
Philosophy Faculty Works Philosophy
2-1-2016




Follow this and additional works at: http://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Faculty Works by
an authorized administrator of Works. For more information, please contact myworks@swarthmore.edu.
Recommended Citation
Peter Baumann. (2016). "Epistemic Contrastivism, Knowledge And Practical Reasoning". Erkenntnis. Volume 81, Issue 1. 59-68.
http://works.swarthmore.edu/fac-philosophy/351




Erkenntnis 81, 2016, 59-68 
 
Abstract 
Epistemic contrastivism is the view that knowledge is a ternary relation 
between a person, a proposition and a set of contrast propositions. This 
view is in tension with widely shared accounts of practical reasoning: be it 
the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable 
practical reasoning based on them or sufficient for the acceptability of the 
use of the premises in practical reasoning, or be it the claim that there is a 
looser connection between knowledge and practical reasoning. Given 
plausible assumptions, epistemic contrastivism implies that we should cut 
all links between knowledge and practical reasoning. However, the denial 
of any such link requires additional and independent arguments; if such 
arguments are lacking, then all the worse for epistemic contrastivism. 
KEYWORDS: epistemic contrastivism; knowledge; practical reasoning; 
contrast sets. 
 
One of the more recent developments in epistemology is contrastivism. Contrastivism 
about knowledge, “epistemic contrastivism” (see Sinnott-Armstrong 2004, Schaffer 
2005, Karjalainen & Morton 2003, and Johnson 2001) has it that knowledge is not a 
binary relation between a subject and a proposition but a ternary relation between a 
subject, a proposition known and a set of one or more (false) contrast propositions.1 The 
form of fully explicit knowledge attributions is thus not simply “S knows that p” but “S 
knows that p, rather than q”. In the following I will argue that epistemic contrastivism 
can only allow for an acceptable account of practical reasoning if it subscribes to an 
                                                 
1 For the sake of simplicity, I will often express myself here as if there is only one contrast 
proposition. Nothing of any substance depends on this simplification.  
 2 
extreme view about the relation between knowledge and practical reasoning. If the latter 
is problematic or not supported by independent arguments, then epistemic contrastivism 
is in trouble (though not necessarily contrastivism in general).  
Some philosophers hold that the premises of practical reasoning should be known – 
otherwise the reasoning would not be acceptable (see Hawthorne 2004, 29; Stanley 2005, 
9; however, this is not uncontroversial: see, e.g., recently Baumann 2012, sections 5-6). 
Let us take this as the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable 
practical reasoning (the “necessity claim”). Since some of our actions are based on 
acceptable instances of practical reasoning, some of our actions would thus turn out to be 
based on knowledge. Or one can hold that knowledge of the premises of a given piece of 
practical reasoning is sufficient for acceptable use of the premise in that reasoning (the 
“sufficiency claim”). Since some of our practical reasoning is based on knowledge of the 
premises (and everything else is in order with it), some of our practical reasoning is 
acceptable and the actions based on it are rational. Alternatively, one could hold that even 
though knowledge of the premises is neither necessary for acceptable practical reasoning 
nor sufficient for it (given that everything else is fine with the piece of practical 
reasoning) it improves its quality. Finally, one could hold the rather extreme view that the 
question whether the premises are known or not is simply irrelevant to the acceptability 
or quality of the corresponding piece of practical reasoning.2 - How does all this square 
with epistemic contrastivism? 
Consider a case. Suppose Fred comes into his kitchen and notices a lot of what 
looks like water next to the washing machine. It is indeed water. Does he know that there 
is a lot of water next to the washing machine? According to the epistemic contrastivist he 
might know this in the sense that he, say, knows that there is water rather than gasoline. 
He can know this even if he does not know that there is water rather than some new 
explosive that looks just like water but explodes on touch (suppose he has stored some of 
the explosive on the shelves next to the washing machine). So far, so good. What should 
Fred do?  
He might reason like this:  
 
                                                 
2 There are other possible views but they lack plausibility and need not be discussed here.  
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(PR) 
(1) The liquid next to the washing machine is water. 
(2) If that is so, then I should remove the liquid.  
(3) Hence, I should remove the liquid. 
 
We don´t have to deal with the intricacies of practical reasoning here to be able to see 
that there is a question here for the epistemic contrastivist. Is Fred reasoning from a 
known first premise? According to the epistemic contrastivist: both yes and no, in a 
sense. The epistemic contrastivist cannot give an unqualified answer to the question 
whether Fred knows the (first) premise of the argument. The epistemic contrastivist only 
allows herself talk about contrastive knowledge: Fred knows that there is water rather 
than gasoline; in that sense he knows (1) in (PR). But he does not know that there is 
water rather than the new explosive liquid; in that sense he does not know (1) in (PR). 
There is nothing extraordinary or unusual about (PR) and the case above. There are many 
cases like that, that is, cases in which the subject could, according to the epistemic 
contrastivist, correctly be said to know some proposition, given certain contrast 
propositions (when certain contrast propositions are considered) but could at the same 
time also correctly be said not to know the proposition, given certain other contrast 
propositions (when certain other contrast propositions are considered).  
This is troublesome if it makes a difference to the quality of a piece of practical 
reasoning whether the subject knows its premises. I will focus here on the necessity claim 
but similar things hold for the sufficiency claim (see below). If knowledge (whether 
understood contrastively or not) of the premises of a piece of practical reasoning is a 
necessary condition for the acceptability of that piece of practical reasoning, then 
contrastivists are not able to tell whether a given piece of practical reasoning as such is 
acceptable, even given that everything else needed for acceptable practical reasoning is in 
place (like the formal correctness of the reasoning). It would depend on the contrast 
proposition considered.3 If we restrict ourselves to the alternative that the liquid might be 
gasoline, then the reasoning looks very good. However, if we also consider the alternative 
                                                 
3 I am putting aside two types of special cases: cases where the target proposition p has no contrast q 
such that the subject knows that p rather than q, and cases where the target proposition p has no 
contrast q such that the subject does not know that p rather than q. 
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that it might be explosive, then it looks very bad. All this is certainly very counter-
intuitive: The acceptability of a piece of practical reasoning does not seem to be relative 
to something like a set of contrast propositions. It should be good or bad in a non-
relativized way. Lacking an argument to the effect that appearances are deceptive here 
and intuitions misleading, we must take the counter-intuitive nature of the above 
consequence to be a serious problem for epistemic contrastivism if it adheres to such a 
close link between knowledge and practical reasoning. 
But why couldn’t the acceptability of a piece of practical reasoning be as 
contrastive as knowledge (whatever the details of such an account)? There are serious 
problems with such a view. Consider all pieces of practical reasoning which are 
“otherwise” acceptable, that is, apart from the question whether they meet the condition 
that the premises are known by the reasoner. There will then (given the necessity claim) 
hardly be any such piece (leaving aside extreme cases; see fn.3) which is acceptable in an 
“absolute” way, that is, acceptable across all variations of contrast propositions.4 But the 
aim of practical reasoning is to find out what one ought to do (not just what ought to be 
the case) in this absolute sense. Why that? Well, Fred needs to act and he cannot both 
remove and not remove the liquid. There is also no such thing as a “contrastive action”: It 
makes no sense to say that he removed the liquid in some respect but that in another 
respect he did not remove it.5 Given that practical reasoning aims at finding out what one 
ought to do, it has to be as absolute (in the sense of invariance across variation of contrast 
sets) as the acting rationalized and motivated by it.  
But couldn’t there still be a contrastivist understanding of ought and a contrastivist 
conception of practical reasoning? The problem is that even though we can make a lot of 
sense of contrastive obligations (see, e.g, Snedegar 2013a), they are limited to restricted 
sets of contrasts and don’t help with the question what one ought to do all things 
considered and across all variations of contrast sets. Perhaps I ought to donate my 10-
Dollar-bill to charity rather than donate nothing but perhaps I also ought to donate my old 
                                                 
4 Absoluteness in this sense is compatible with contrastivity. What matters is the uniqueness and 
invariance (with contrast sets) of the answer to the question “What is the right way to think about 
this and what should I do?”.  
5 Sure, given one standard of cleanliness Fred might count as having removed all of the liquid while 
given another standard of cleanliness he might not count as such. However, this is not the issue here. 
The problem above remains even for fixed standards of cleanliness.  
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car to charity rather than only $10. How can all my insight into my contrastive 
obligations guide my action? I need a clear answer to the question “What ought I to do?” 
(e.g., “How much ought I to donate?”). I need some absolute deliberative ought like, e.g., 
“I ought to donate 30% of my income”. Guidance for action requires such absolute 
oughts and practical reasoning is supposed to identify them. If we restrict ourselves to 
contrastive oughts, then we would have to say that for some X we ought to X, given one 
contrast, but that it is not the case that we ought to X, given another contrast. One can 
even imagine cases where for some X we ought to X, given one contrast, but that we 
ought not to X, given another contrast: Perhaps one ought to give exactly $10 to charity 
rather than nothing but one ought not to give only $10 to charity rather than $100. All this 
misses the practical question motivating and making sense of practical reasoning 
completely. Practical reasoning aims at identifying one required act (or set of acts), not 
many and not many mutually incompatible acts; it aims at identifying one ought and not 
many different or even incompatible ones. Hence, practical reasoning itself has to be 
understood as absolute.  
To put it differently: Even if “being justified in Xing” (where “X” ranges over acts) 
and related terms should turn out to be contrastive, “having most reason to X, all things 
considered” doesn’t allow for variation with contrasts.6 Pro tanto reasons for Xing might 
turn out to be contrastive but all-things-considered reasons for Xing will be absolute.7 
Apart from all that, it is hard to see how one could reason in the light of contrastivism 
about practical reasoning: A conclusion of the form “I should remove the liquid but only 
given some but not other ways of looking at the situation” seems close to a Moore-
paradox and unacceptable. 
One might object that the variability of contrast sets need not lead to an 
indeterminacy about the acceptability of a given piece of practical reasoning, even if one 
sticks with the claim that knowledge of the premises is necessary for acceptable practical 
reasoning. One could argue that acceptable practical reasoning only requires knowledge 
that p, rather than q, for all of those contrast propositions q which are of practical 
                                                 
6 see Sinnott-Armstrong 2006, esp. chs. 5 and 6 who does not defend contrastivism about all-things-
considered reasons even though he defends contrastivism about justified moral belief. See also 
Snedegar 2013b, fn.2 for this restriction of contrastivism to pro tanto reasons. 
7 see also Jordan 2014 who argues that virtue-ethical motivations are not compatible with 
contrastivism about practical reasons.  
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relevance to the context of deliberation. Roughly, one only needs to be able to rule out all 
the practically relevant alternatives to p. This move towards a more complicated claim 
about knowledge and practical reasoning, however, won’t help much. Consider the above 
case about Fred’s liquid and assume for a change that there are exactly two practically 
relevant contrast propositions: one, q, barely relevant and just above the threshold of 
relevance (e.g., The liquid next to the washing machine is XYZ which if true would only 
cause mild annoyance to Fred), and the other, r, of dramatic practical relevance (e.g., The 
liquid next to the washing machine is the explosive Super-Duper which if true would 
cause a serious threat to Fred’s neighbourhood, given the proximity of municipal gas 
tanks). Suppose Fred knows that the liquid is water, rather than Super-Duper, but that he 
doesn’t know it’s water, rather than XYZ. Since he cannot rule out all of the practically 
relevant contrast propositions, Fred does not know the crucial premise (1) in (PR). His 
reasoning to the conclusion that he should remove the liquid would thus turn out to be 
unacceptable and deficient. This, however, seems very counter-intuitive: Isn’t it even 
obvious that Fred ought to remove the liquid? Our problem remains. 
Perhaps some would want to propose to measure degrees of practical relevance 
(apart from relevance thresholds below which the relevance is negligible) and modify the 
above idea along the following lines: Practical reasoning only requires knowledge that p, 
rather than q, for the contrast proposition q which is of higher practical relevance in the 
context of deliberation than any other contrast proposition. This would avoid the 
problems connected with the inclusion of all practically relevant contrast propositions. 
However, apart from the problem that two contrast propositions might both be of the 
highest and equal practical relevance but lead to opposing verdicts about the subject’s 
knowledge (like, perhaps, the gasoline- and the explosives-proposition above), there are 
also serious problems with the very idea of degrees of practical relevance. What 
determines them? It might be worse to cause an explosion than to let gasoline damage the 
neighbor’s apartment. But it might also be much more likely that the liquid is gasoline 
than that it is explosive. Should we then let the expected utility (or disutility) of the 
alternative acts (removing gasoline, removing the explosives) determine degrees of 
relevance? Going by the highest expected utility might give us the verdict that the 
practically relevant contrast proposition is the gasoline proposition. Given this, Fred 
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should remove the liquid (he knows it’s water, rather than gasoline). But this seems to 
lack appropriate justification, given the disastrous consequences of perhaps causing an 
explosion.  
If, in contrast, we go by the alternative principle of minimizing possible disutility 
(something like a maximin principle that gives little or no weight to probabilities and 
according to which one ought to choose an act the worst possible outcome of which is at 
least as good as the worst possible outcome of any alternative act), then the practically 
relevant contrast proposition is the explosives-proposition. Given that Fred does not 
(according to the contrastivist) know that the liquid is water rather than the explosive 
liquid, there is then no acceptable piece of practical reasoning in our case that would lead 
Fred to the conclusion that he should remove the liquid. Perhaps he should simply wait 
until some emergency team of anti-explosive specialists arrives. However, this might 
seem overly pessimistic to some.  
Much more importantly, however, is that we are now facing a familiar dispute 
between adherents of expected utility views and maximin views of rational choice (see 
amongst many Resnik 1987 for an overview). Which one of such views should we 
favour? But most importantly: Now it turns out or becomes at least very plausible that 
what really drives the debate about the acceptability of some piece of practical reasoning 
(given the need to restrict the set of contrast propositions to practically relevant ones) is 
some principle like the expected-utility-principle or the maximin principle but not the 
claim that acceptable practical reasoning requires knowledge of its premises.8 - The 
above attempt not to let the variability of contrast sets for knowledge lead to an unwanted 
indeterminacy of practical reasoning by introducing a restriction to practically relevant 
contrast propositions seems bound to fail. To be sure, impossibility arguments are very 
hard to get but as long as there is no potential solution of the indeterminacy problem for 
contrastivism even on the horizon we should be pessimistic about the chances of there 
being such a solution. 
If one assumes that knowledge of the premises is sufficient (or necessary and 
sufficient) for acceptable practical reasoning (given that everything else is in place), 
                                                 
8 Finally, there might be an infinite number of contrast propositions to consider or, at least, an 
indefinite number. How should we, under such conditions, ever get any grip on what the practically 
relevant alternative could be? 
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similar problems will arise. One and the same state of the subject can (in non-extreme 
cases; see fn.3) both be seen as sufficient (given knowledge of the relevant premises) for 
acceptable use of the premise in practical reason and as not sufficient for that (given lack 
of knowledge of the relevant premises). If everything else needed for acceptable practical 
reasoning is in place, then it could still be indeterminate whether some given piece of 
practical reasoning is good enough to be accepted or not. Like in the case of the 
indeterminacy about necessary conditions (see above) we would be left without an idea 
of how practical reasoning can guide action and tell us what we ought to do. - If we 
switch from knowledge as a precondition of rational action to justified belief as such a 
precondition, we still have to deal with the same kinds of issues: justified belief is as 
susceptible to contrastivist analysis as knowledge.9  
Even if we don’t accept the idea of a close connection between knowledge and 
practical reasoning (like in the necessity or the sufficiency claim), the epistemic 
contrastivist still has a problem. If one claims that knowledge of the premises of some 
piece of practical reasoning is neither necessary for the acceptability of this instance of 
practical reasoning nor sufficient for the acceptability of the use of the premises in the 
reasoning but also claims that it still improves upon its quality, then one has to face 
problems similar to the ones above.10 
Is it better then to claim that knowledge is completely irrelevant to the quality of 
practical reasoning? This will seem quite implausible to many people: How could 
knowledge and practical reasoning be that independent from each other?11 But epistemic 
contrastivism would (given plausible further assumptions about practical reasoning) 
                                                 
9 see for a similar problem about moral justification my 2008. 
10 I won’t explain this further here in order to avoid repetitions. - What if one said that practical 
reasoning based on a given proposition p is better (worse) the more (fewer) contrast propositions q 
there are such that the subject knows p, rather than q (thanks to a referee for this idea)? There are 
difficult questions about how to count contrast propositions and how to weigh their relative 
importance. Apart from that, this is not quite the proposal under discussion, namely that knowledge 
(construed contrastively or not) of a proposition improves the quality of practical reasoning based on 
it; this is rather the idea that “more knowledge” improves the quality of practical reasoning. 
However, this “additional” knowledge does not affect whether the subject knows the relevant target 
proposition p: If yes, then the additional knowledge won’t improve her situation with respect to 
knowledge of p; if not, then the additional knowledge won’t help her with respect to knowledge of 
p. To be sure: It might well be good to know more rather than less but this point seems irrelevant to 
the topic here. 
11 This view is much stronger than the (quite popular) mere denial of the necessity claim or the 
sufficiency claim. 
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entail an extreme and very interesting claim about the relation between knowledge and 
practical reasoning: an “irrelevance view”. However, one does need additional and 
independent arguments for the irrelevance view. Lacking such arguments - and 
contrastivists haven’t come forward with any such arguments so far -, we should go by 
modus tollens and have at least some serious doubts (if not: reject) epistemic 
contrastivism. 
Is there a way out of this problem for the epistemic contrastivist who does not want 
to cut all ties between knowledge and practical reasoning? It does not help to propose a 
contextualist version of epistemic contrastivism according to which the relevant contrast 
set is fixed by the context of the knowledge-attributor (see Cohen 1988, DeRose 2009, 
and Lewis 1996). What the subject has reason to do (typically) depends (at least to a large 
degree) on the practical situation of the subject (which often includes concern for others) 
and not so much on the potentially quite different practical situation of the attributor.12 
The contextual variability of verdicts about “knowledge” between different attributors is 
as problematic here as the variability of contrast sets. 
In contrast, subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) about knowledge (see Fantl & 
McGrath 2002, Hawthorne 2004 and Stanley 2005) – the view that knowledge does not 
only depend on the epistemic situation of the subject (true belief, warrant) but also on 
their non-epistemic situation, especially their practical interests – does not have that 
particular problem because the practical situation relevant to knowledge attributions is 
the subject’s practical situation. However, it is hard to see how epistemic contrastivism 
could be combined with SSI: According to the latter, there is a unique true answer to the 
question whether a given subject knows a given proposition whereas the question is 
underspecified according to the former. According to SSI, the subject-sensitive factors 
are fixed in each case; if one were to use those factors in order to determine the relevant 
contrast set in the given case, one would be giving up an essential element of 
contrastivism, namely the variability of contrast sets.  
But what if one combined SSI with contrastivism by adding the following condition 
as a necessary condition of knowledge - in addition to (A) the belief condition, (B) the 
                                                 
12 Sinnott-Armstrong in 2004 or 2006 defends contrastivism but does not want any contextualism in 
his theory. - Similar problems arise for any combination of epistemic contrastivism with epistemic 
relativism (see, e.g., MacFarlane 2005 and also Kölbel 2002). 
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truth condition, and (C) the contrastivist “ruling out” condition: (D) S knows that p (out 
of the contrast set) only if S is rational to act and prefer as if p is true.13 Since the latter is 
sufficient for permissible use of p as a premise of practical reasoning, knowledge of p, 
too, turns out to be sufficient for permissible use of p as a premise of practical reasoning. 
One might conclude then that this modification of contrastivism can explain the 
connection between knowledge and acceptable practical reasoning or, at least, the 
sufficiency of the former for the latter. What should one think about this alternative 
proposal? 
First of all, the lack of an explanation of why or how acceptable practical reasoning 
requires knowledge of its premises is a serious limitation of the scope of this proposal 
(but see below for an alternative alternative). More importantly, what explains why and 
how knowledge is sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning is none of the conditions 
(A)-(C) above but only condition (D). In other words, what explains that knowledge of p 
is sufficient for acceptable practical reasoning based on it is that knowledge of p requires 
the rational permissibility of acting on p: for instance, the rational permissibility of using 
p as a premise in practical reasoning (which can be regarded as one way of acting on p). 
But now we are (at least partly) explaining acceptable practical reasoning in terms of 
knowledge of the relevant premise the role of which can in turn be explained in terms of 
acceptable practical reasoning using that premise. Our alternative does not look that 
substantial any more – and uninformatively circular. It is not clear at all, to say the least, 
that knowledge plays any interesting role in an account of acceptable practical reasoning. 
- Alternatively, one might add to our alternative “pragmatic” contrastivism the claim that 
knowledge of p is also a necessary (and not only a sufficient) condition for acceptable 
practical reasoning based on p. This would certainly lack the drawback of only 
formulating a sufficient condition (see above). However, the above worries about 
uninformative circularity would be even more pressing. Again, the concept of knowledge 
ceases to play any substantive role in an account of practical reasoning.  
Finally, could one not simply go back to a relevant alternatives theory of 
knowledge (see, e.g., Austin 1979, 87ff., 98ff.; Dretske 1970; Dretske 1981; Goldman 
1992) according to which knowledge requires the subject’s ability to rule out all those 
                                                 
13 Thanks to a referee for pressing me here and coming up with this idea. 
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alternatives that are relevant in her situation? This is a very rough characterization of the 
view but sufficient here. Even though there are some clear similarites between relevant 
alternatives theories and epistemic contrastivism (see Dretske 1972), relevant alternatives 
theories are not contrastivist as they don’t allow for the variability of sets of contrast 
propositions; rather, the situation of the subject determines one unique set of relevant 
alternatives. Hence, according to relevant alternatives theories (in contrast to epistemic 
contrastivism) there is typically a unique true answer to the (unrelativized) question 
whether a subject knows a given proposition. Apart from that, there will be additional 
problems with determining practical relevance (see the passages above on practically 
relevant contrats propositions).  
With no help to expect from its theoretical “neighbors”, contrastivism about 
knowledge is forced to choose between two options: either to give up on the idea that 
there is an interesting connection between knowledge and practical reasoning or keep this 
idea but give up on the aim of even allowing for an acceptable account of practical 
reasoning. Given some relevant connection between knowledge and practical reasoning, 
epistemic contrastivism is not compatible with an acceptable account of practical 
reasoning (not just contrastivist ones). Given an acceptable account of practical 
reasoning, epistemic contrastivism is not compatible with the idea of a relevant 
connection between knowledge and practical reasoning.  
The former option seems out of the question: If an account of knowledge is 
incompatible with any plausible account of practical reasoning, then all the worse for that 
account of knowledge. One would need additional, independent, and very strong 
arguments against the feasibility of any plausible account of practical reasoning. Lacking 
such arguments, one should rather give up on the account of knowledge. The latter option 
– cutting all conceptual ties between knowledge and practical reasoning - is only slightly 
better for epistemic contrastivism. If this view entails (given plausible further 
assumptions) that there is no relevant link between knowledge and practical reasoning, 
then, again, one would need additional, independent, and strong enough arguments for 
such a strong (see fn.11 above) irrelevance view. Otherwise, epistemic contrastivism 
cannot plausibly claim to have offered support for an interesting account of practical 
reasoning. Should we really believe that an epistemological view as such can speak 
 12 
decisively for or against a view on practical reasoning? Lacking such arguments for the 
irrelevance view, we should, again, go by modus tollens, and rather reject epistemic 
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